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HE U. S. oil industry has been subjected to
varying degrees of price controls since August 1971
when general price controls were levied on the entire
U. S. economy. As conU’ols were “phased-out” in other
industries, more stringent price regulations were im-
posed on the oil industry in response to the October
1973 oil embargo and the subsequent quadnipling of
world oil prices.
The oil price control program is directed at cush-
ioning the domestic impact of sharply higher external
oil prices. In this respect, the controls effort can be
regarded as successful since the effective domestic
price for petroleum remains, in fact, below world
market prices. Economic analysis, however, indicates
that the controls will (1) become ineffective, over
time, with respect to the above stated intention and
(2) will enhance the ability of external suppliers to
manipulate prices.
In support of these conclusions, this article in-
cludes a discussion of the mechanics of the controls
program as it currently exists. Using economic theory
as a foundation, the eventual effects of controls on
domestic production, imports, and the domestic price
of oil are derived. In this regard, two of the more
popular questions regarding decontrol are analyzed
will decontrol result in (1) higher domestic petro—
lenin prices and (2) increased domestic production
and reduced imports?
BACKGROUND
As indicated in Table I, U. S. oil refiners currently
process about 12.9 million barrels per day (MBD). Of
this total approximately 4.7 MBD, or 36 percent, are
produced abroad.
The United States did not always rely to such an
extent on external oil supplies. In the mid—1960s oil
imports represented only 20 percent of total U. S.
consumption. In fact, as late as 1971 import quotas
on petroleum products existed in order to prevent
“cheap” foreign oil from placing domestic oil pro-
ducers at a “competitive disadvantage”.
Beginning in 1966, the rate of increase in domes-
tic petroleum production began to decline, and in
1972 domestic petroleum production in the United
States actually decreased from its 1971 level, Sev-
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eral factors, including price controls and envfronmen-
tal and safety regulations, were responsible for in-
creased U. ~. reliance on foreign sources of supply.
OIL PRICE CONTROLS
Through a series of steps, the Federal Energy Ad-
ministration (FEA) has decreed that “old” oil — that
is, oil produced from domestic wells not exceeding
the 1972 rate of output from these wells — can sell
for no more than $5.25 per barrel. As of March 1975,
imported oil sold for $13.28 and “new” domestic
oil — that is, oil produced from both new wells and
from old wells in excess of 1972 output — sold for
$11.47 per barrel (Table II) ,1
In March 1975 (latest available data) total crude
oil used by domestic refiners consisted of approxi-
mately 41 percent “old” domestic oil, 27 percent “new”
domestic oil, and 32 percent imports. The effective
domestic price paid by domestic refiners for a barrel
of oil is simply the weighted sum of the three prices:
(0.41) >< $5.25 + (0.27) x $11.47
± (0.32) x $13.28 = ~9.49
I As indicated ho Table II, pctroleonn price data are available
through July 1975. but the proportions of “new” and ‘old”
domestic production are only available through March. For
the sake of data consistency, the analysis in this paper is
based on the prices and relative proportions that prevailed
iso March 1975.
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basis of this ratio, all refiners are issned entitlements
to enable them to purchase “old” crude in the same
proportion as the national average.4 For example, if
total crude usage in the nation in any particular
month consists of 41 percent “old” crude, then each
refiner is “entitled” to purchase at least 41 percent
of his input mix at the controlled price of $5.25 per
barrel, no matter where the oil actually comes from.
In principle, the refiner with access to less than the
national average of”old” crude oil can present his
entitlements to another refiner, who has more than
the national average of “old” crude, in exchange for
crude at a price of $5.25 per barrel. In practice, how-
ever, the physical exchange of oil rarely takes place.
Rather, the entitlements are bought and sold among
refiners, with the price determined on the basis of
the difference between the controlled and uncon-
trolled price of a barrel of oil.5 For example, in
March the average priceper barrel of “new” domestic
and imported crude was $12.56. Therefore, the FEA
established an entitlement price of $7.31 for that
month. This is the price at which petroleum refiners
exchanged entitlements in March.
4
For ease of illustration, it is assumed that entitlements are
physical documents which are issued by the FEA. iso reality,
however, they are simply accounting fictions to which refiners




k establishes the price per entitlement but their
choice is isot arbitrary. The market price of an entitlement
would rise to the difference between the controlled and un-
controlled price of a barrel of crude, even if the FEA re-
snained out of the transaction.
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Refiners with access to less than the national aver
age of old crude can sell entitlements to those
refiners with mote old crude than the national aver-
ige The sale of entitlements represents a source of
revenue to the refiner with less than the national
average of “old” crude. The refiner who, for example,
Oehes mamlv on imported oil can use his entitlements
revenue to reduce the effective cost of his crude oil
input.” With “old” oil representing about 41 percent
of the national input mix and the price of an entitle-
merit at $7.31, the effective cost per barrel of fin-
ports to the refiner is reduced by $3.00 (.41 >< $7.31).
That is, imports are subsidized to the tune of $3.00
per barrel. For every barrel of oil imported, the im-
porter is entitled to purchase 0,41 barrel at the con-
trolled price of $5.25 and is forced to pay the market
price for only 0.59 barrel.
On the other hand, a refiner who uses more than
the national average of “old” crude is required to
purchase entitlements in order to enable him to proc-
ess “old” oil in excess of the national average. A
refiner who is able to meet his desired production
schedule using only “old” crude is required to pur-
chase entitlements for 59 percent of his input. In
this case the effective cost per barrel to this refiner
is increased by $4.31 (59 x $7.31). That is, “old”
domestic oil is taxed to the tune of $4.31 per barrel.
“The analysis with imported oil is also applicable to “new”
domestic oil.
Table II
AVERAGE CRUDE OIL PRICE TO DOMESTIC REFINERS
Otd , New Import, Weighted
Effective Averoqe
Osontity Ouont:Iy Quont~ty Domestic Price of
Price as o Price as a Price a, a Price New a Price
per Percent per Percont per Percent pa’ - Imported of
Ba’rel of Total Ba re: of Total Barrel at Total Barrel Oil
2
, Entitlement
‘974 November 5125 45.5’ SI 0.90 22.4 312.53 32.1’ 58.83 Si0.25 $5.00
Decernbe’ 5.25 44.9 1 1.05 23.1 12.82 32.0 902 10.25 5.00
1975 January 5.25 39.7 11.28 28.8 12.77 31.4 9.27 11.25 6.00
I’ebruory 5.25 41.3 11.39 264 13.05 32.4 9.40 12.00 6.75
March 5.25 41.0 11.47 27.4 13.28 31.6 9.49 12.56 7.31
April 5.25 NA 11.64 NA 13.26 28 5 NA 12.54 7.29
May 5.25 NA 11.69 NA 13.27 29.2 NA 12.64 7.39
June 5.25 NA 11.73 NA 14.15 31.9 NA 13.07 7.82
July 5.25 NA 1 2.30P NA 14.03P 34.3 NA 13.38 8.13
Aogsst 5 25 NA NA NA NA 36 2N A 13.56 8.31
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In essence, the price control and entitlements effort
is an income redistribution program within the oil
industry. Domestic “old” oil is taxed and the pro-
ceeds are used to subsidise the purchase of imported
oil. This subsidy/tax program, through its effect on
the relative prices of imported and domestically pro-
duced oil, has had a perverse impact on the national
goal of self-reliance. Domestic production is discour-
aged by the imposition of price controls and there-
fore has continued to decline. This, in turn, has in-
creased our reliance on external suppliers.
.AN EVALUATION OF SOME
DECONTBOL ARGUMENTS
Will Decontrol Lead to Higher
I’etrolenni Prices?
Regardless of whether petroleum prices are coms-
trolled or decontrolled, the price of crude oil to
domestic refiners is going to increase, However, the
price increases associated with either alternative have
completely different implications for domestic produc-
tion and imports.
The continued maintenance of the oil price con-
trols program will not prevent domestic oil prices
from rising. This would occur even without price
increases for any of the three sources of supply
(“old”, “new”, imports) to domestic refiners. As pro-
duction of “old” domestic oil declines and imports
increase as a result of the controls program, the
proportion of the higher priced oil (domestic “new”
and imports) increases, thereby raising the effective
domestic price of petroleum.
The response to the lifting of domestic price con-
trols will be an immediate rise in the price of petro-
leum. As long as the United States imports any oil
at all, the price of crude to domestic refiners will
be dictated by the foreign oil cartel. Accompanying
the price rise, however, will be an increase in the
quantity of oil produced domestically. Although the
increase would probably not be of a magnitude to
allow achievement of self-sufficiency in time short run,
it does imply a cutback in imports.
Such a situation would create difficulties for foreign
suppliers, particularly the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), who have already
been forced to cut back production in order to main-
tain existing prices. With reduced U.S. purchases of
imported oil as a result of decontrol, additional down-
ward pressure on external oil prices would result, In
order to maintain prices, OPEC would have to volun-
tarily accept a further cut in production and income — and at a time when their domestic development
programs are in high gear
is the Market Solution Viable?
The free market, or decontrol, solution is rejected
by various groups of society. Proponents of continued
price controls on “old” oil suggest that although the
market price of petroleum products has’’already
doubled, the reduction in the quantity of petroleum
products consumed has been insignificant. In fact,
they argue that whatever reductions have been ob-
served can be attributed to the reduction in business
activity, not the increase in prices. In addition, they
snaintain that the current high prices have not elicited
increased petroleum production. Curiously, these
arguments lead to the conclusion that in order to
achieve both less reliance on imports -and greater
domestic production, price increases substantially in
excess of those already observed would be necessary.
Opponents of continued price controls, on the other
hand, argue that economic agents are not indifferent
to the prices they pay and do indeed respond to
changes in relative prices. They point out, however,
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that it is necessary to distinguish between a short-run
and a long-run response of both quantity supplied
and quantity demanded. With respect to the quantity
demanded, the opponents of price controls point out
that the short-run response to a hike in prices can
indeed be very weak. This has to do with the fact
that the nation’s capital stock is energy intensive and
costs of rapid adjustment to less energy intensive
means of production are substantial. The energy re-
quirement per unit of output that has been built into
production processes has been based on “cheap” oil,
and as a result of today’s prices, much of the existing
capital stock has become inefficient.
Reductions in the quantity of oil demanded depend
on time substitution of relatively less energy intensive
means of production. An example would be the re-
placement of an automobile that averages 15 miles to
a gallon of gasoline with one that gets 30 miles per
gallon. The fuel costs per passenger mile as a measure
of the product produced by an automobile would then
be reduced. While this substitution process is pro-
ceeding quite rapidly in the area of automobiles, the
conversion cost to many industries is very high in the
short run and therefore would be expected to take
place only over time. Although this adjustment does
take time, it must not be forgotten that the economic
incentives to make it are great and there is no reason
to believe that the adjustment will not eventually be
made. The quantity demanded is indeed responsive
to price if sufficient time is given for the affected
economic agents to respond.
Opponents of continued price controls also point out
that the response of the quantity of oil supplied to a
change in price has not been substantial because a
great deal of uncertainty surrounds the return on new
investment projects. For example, exploration for new
oil wells, more intensive utilization of existing oil
wells, as well as research into new methods of produc-
tion (such as the liquification of coal and offshore
drilling) all require extensive capital investments.
Even though today’s high market prices for oil might
justify such investment expenditures, uncertainty with
respect to the future price of oil greatly lessens the
incentive to undertake such investments.~This argu-
ment implies that domestic producers expect world
market prices to decline from their present highs and
that “cheap” imports could once again be substituted
for domestic production.
7
1’here is the additional problem of uncertainty about future
tax prograuss which could reduce sharply the rate of rcturn
on these investments, even if the current price of oil prevails.
Former Secretary of the Treasury George P. Schultz
recognized this dilemma of uncertainty. He suggested
that if self-reliance is indeed a national goal, uncer-
tainty which faces domestic producers should be
eliminated. To this end Schultz proposed a variable
tariff on imports designed to maintain today’s high
external price. In the event that the foreign oil cartel
would disintegrate and world market prices decline,
the proceeds from the tariff could he distributed to
consumers via the tax system.
In general, then, tlmose opposed to decontrol are not
convinced that market forces will produce greater
self-sufficiency and lower petroleum product prices.
Those in favor of the removal of petroleum price
controls, however, contend that government restric-
tions only hinder domestic oil production and provide
incentives to import, thereby supporting the collusive
actions of OPEC. Both of these effects tend to enhance
the unity of OPEC members, whose continued
strength would result in higher petroleum prices for
U. S. consumers. An additional objection is that reli-
ance on controls to provide solutions to economic
problems in many cases only aggravates and intensi-
fies the initial problem.
(::ONCLUSION
The analysis presented in this article points out
that the currently existing oil price controls program
has been successful in achieving its intended purpose — cushioning domestic prices of petroleum products
from the higher world oil prices. But the analysis
also suggests that the controls program is in conffict
with its stated purpose over the long run. In particu-
lar, controls provide both disincentives to produce oil
domestically and incentives to import oil. As imported
oil becomes an increasing proportion of total domestic
consumption, the effective domestic price of oil \vill
increase also, The greater U. S. reliance on foreign
sources of supply, in turn, enhances the unity of time
foreign oil cartel such that the United States becomes
increasingly vulnerable to external pricing and pro-
ducing decisions. A situation has been fostered which
would perpetuate rising world oil prices in the future.
There is an alternative to this rather ominous
scenario. Even though petroleum prices would in-
crease as a result of decontrol, incentives for both
increased domestic production and reduced imports
are provided. Increased domestic production and
reduced imports, in turn, would tend to strain the
unity of the oil cartel, and hence, be conducive to
lower world market prices for petroleum in the future.
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